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Abstract
It has long been understood that externalities of some kind are
responsible for Sen’s (1970) theorem on the impossibility of a Paretian
liberal. However, Saari and Petron (2006) show that for any social
preference cycle generated by combining the weak Pareto principle
and individual decisiveness, every decisive individual must suffer at
least one strong negative externality. We show that this fundamental
result only holds when individual preferences are strict. Building on
their contribution, we prove a general theorem for the case of weak
preferences.
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1 Introduction
Sen’s (1970) theorem on the impossibility of a Paretian liberal is one of the
landmark results of social choice theory.1 To illustrate the theorem, Sen
presents the following example. There are two individuals, Prude and Lewd,
and a copy of the risqué Lady Chatterley’s Lover. There are three options:
Prude reads the book (x), Lewd reads the book (y), or no one reads the book
(z). Lewd prefers most for Prude to read the book. Sen says that Lewd would
“delight” in Prude’s discomfort (p. 155). Given a choice between reading the
book himself or no one reading it, Lewd would prefer (being a lewd) to
read it. His preference ordering is, therefore, xPlyPlz.
2 Prude prefers most
that no one reads it. However, if someone must then he would rather it be
him. Prude believes that if Lewd reads it then he could become even more
depraved. Prude’s ordering is, therefore, zPpxPpy.
Given that the alternatives are taken to represent social states with “each
state being a complete description of society including every individual’s
position in it”,3 alternatives y and z differ only in ways that are private to
Lewd, and x and z differ only in ways that are private to Prude. On foot of
this, we might feel that Lewd’s and Prude’s preferences over these respective
pairs should be given special status when determining the social preference.
Suppose we make Lewd decisive over {y, z}. This means that yPlz implies
yPz and zPly implies zPy. Similarly, make Prude decisive over {x, z}. If we
combine this decisiveness with the weak Pareto principle then we obtain a
cycle in the social preference relation, yPzPxPy.
Many argue that Sen’s formal framework is not the correct one for mod-
eling individual rights.4 However, there are aggregation contexts where Sen’s
1Suzumura (2011) is a survey. Salles (2008, 2009) and Salles and Zhang (2010) is recent
foundational work on Sen’s theorem.
2Our notation is standard.
3Sen (1970, p. 152).
4These critics favor a game form approach to rights. See Nozick (1974), Sugden (1985)
and Gaertner, Suzumura and Pattanaik (1992).
2
idea of decisiveness remains relevant.5 For example, the alternatives could
represent candidates for appointment at a university rather than complete
social states. In this case, Professor A could be a co-author of candidates y
and z and Professor B could be a co-author of candidates x and z. On the
basis of the superior information that co-authorship typically provides, the
university could assign {y, z} decisiveness to A and {x, z} decisiveness to B.
A similar social preference cycle can arise. We call cycles that are generated
by combining both weak Pareto and decisiveness Sen cycles.
2 Saari-Petron theorem
Saari and Petron (2006) establish an important necessary condition for Sen
cycles. Every individual must suffer at least one strong negative externality.
This notion of “strong preference” is used in Saari (1995, 2001) and the idea
can be traced back to Luce and Raiffa (1957) and Blau (1975). Given Lewd’s
ordering xPlyPlz we can write, following Saari and Petron, [yz, 0] to denote
that no alternative separates y and z. Lewd’s {y, z} ranking is weak. For
Prude, zPpxPpy and so [zy, 1]. Prude’s {y, z} ranking is strong (and opposed
to Lewd’s). In this formulation 0 and 1 are meant to indicate the intensity
of the binary {y, z} ranking. This intensity measure can be greater than 1 if
there are more alternatives.
Saari and Petron give the following definition (Definition 2, p. 272): For
any pair of alternatives {x, y}, a decisive agent’s choice of x creates a strong,
negative externality if another agent’s sincere ranking is [yx, α] with positive
α intensity. It is easy to verify that Prude and Lewd both suffer strong
negative externalities from each other’s choices. However, surprisingly, this
property is general. Saari and Petron show that if there is a Sen cycle then
every individual who is decisive over some pair in the cycle must suffer at
5On this point see Risse (2001), Dietrich and List (2008), Li and Saari (2008) and Saari
(2011).
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least one strong negative externality. We call this the Saari-Petron theorem.6
In this paper, we show that this result only holds when individual preferences
are strict, i.e. no individual can be indifferent between alternatives. As
the examples below demonstrate, the result does not hold when individual
preferences are weak. However, building on their ideas, we can prove a general
theorem that covers the case of weak preferences.
We say that individual r suffers a negative externality if there exists {a, b}
such that aPb and yet for r we have [ba, β] with β ≥ 0.
Example 1. There are three individuals i, j and k, and their preferences
over the four alternatives are (respectively) xPiyPizPiw, wPjzPjxPjy and
zPkxIkwPky. Note that individual k is indifferent between x and w. Making
i decisive over {y, w}, j decisive over {w, z}, and k decisive over {z, x} leads
to yPwPzPxPy where xPy follows from the weak Pareto principle. For
i we have [xz, 1] and for j we have [wy, 2]. Both suffer strong negative
externalities. However, for k we have both [wy, 0] and [zw, 0], and so k
suffers only weak negative externalities.
The next example shows that cycles can occur where no individual suffers
a strong negative externality.
Example 2. There are four individuals i, j, k and l, and their preferences
over the five alternatives are (respectively) xPiyIizPiwPiv, yPjvIjxPjzPjw,
yIkwPkvIkzIkx and zPlxIlyIlwPlv. Making i decisive over {x, y}, j deci-
sive over {v, w}, k decisive over {w, z} and l decisive over {z, x} leads to
xPyPvPwPzPx where yPv follows from the weak Pareto principle. It is
easy to verify that all individuals suffer only weak negative externalities.
It can be verified in these examples that if individual indifference is bro-
ken in some way, then each individual suffers at least one strong negative
externality.
6Theorem 3 in their paper. The clause that the strong negative externalities are suffered
by decisive individuals is important. In the Lady Chatterley example, a third individual
j could hold the ordering xPjzPjy and suffer no strong negative externality.
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{x, y} {y, z} {z, x}
r xPry yPrz zPrx
r yPrx − zPrx
r xIry zPry zPrx
Table 1: Restoring transitivity for r.
3 General theorem
Saari and Petron (p. 269) describe an “information table” (Table 1) and we
use this to prove our theorem. We consider two cases: one where the cycle
involves three alternatives, and another where the cycle involves four or more
alternatives (but a finite number). Let us consider the first case and assume
that xPyPzPx.
Imagine that we assign to an arbitrary individual r each of these social
pairwise rankings (Table 1, first row). The result is intransitive preferences
for r. In order to restore transitivity (and recover r’s original pairwise rank-
ings induced by her transitive preferences), we need to change at least one
of these pairwise rankings. Assume that zPx follows from the application
of the weak Pareto principle. Therefore, we cannot change that pairwise
ranking. We have to change at least one pairwise ranking over which the
individual is not decisive. The individual cannot be decisive over all of the
decisive pairs in the Sen cycle, otherwise her preferences would be intransi-
tive. Therefore, there must be some pair (or pairs) of alternatives over which
she is not decisive. She could be decisive over no pair.
Without loss of generality, assume that she is not decisive over {x, y} and
either yPrx or xIry (second and third rows of Table 1 respectively). Note
that xIry implies zPry by transitivity.
This leads immediately to the following result.7
Lemma 3. If there is a Sen cycle involving three alternatives, every individ-
ual suffers a negative externality.
7See Bernholz (1982) and Campbell and Kelly (1997).
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This statement holds for all individuals (not just decisive ones). If r is
decisive over either {x, y} or {y, z} (but not both) then xPry or yPrz. In
the former case, transitivity implies that zPrxPry and in the latter case it
implies yPrzPrx. Lemma 3 states that r suffers a negative externality, and
the preceding argument shows that it must be a strong negative externality.
Therefore, we can state the following.
Lemma 4. If there is a Sen cycle involving three alternatives, then every
individual who is decisive over some pair in the cycle suffers a strong negative
externality.
Note that for Examples 1 and 2, the cycles involve more than three alter-
natives. Lemma 4 says that counter-examples to the Saari-Petron theorem
cannot be found with three alternatives.
We now consider the case of cycles involving four or more alternatives.
Suppose that xPyPzPw...vPx. In the arguments below, and without loss of
generality, assume that xPy follows from the application of the weak Pareto
principle. The following generalization of Lemma 3 holds.
Lemma 5. If there is a Sen cycle involving four or more alternatives, every
individual suffers a negative externality.
Proof. Consider the set of pairs in the cycle that follow from the exercise of
someone’s power of decisiveness. We need to prove that there exists {z, w}
in this set such that zPw but wPrz. By contradiction, if this is not the case
then zRrw for all {z, w} in the set. Transitivity implies yRrx. However,
this must be false since, by assumption, xPy follows from the weak Pareto
principle.
Like Lemma 3, this statement holds for all individuals. Suppose now that
r is decisive over some pair in the cycle. We can establish the following result.
Lemma 6. Suppose there is a Sen cycle involving four or more alternatives.
Take any individual who is decisive over some pair in the cycle. If that
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individual suffers only one negative externality, then that externality must be
strong.
Proof. Lemma 5 implies that r must suffer a negative externality. Recall the
information table of Saari and Petron. Without loss of generality assume
that r is decisive over {z, w} and that the sole externality suffered by r arises
from vPx.
{x, y} {y, z} {z, w} ... {v, x}
r xPry ¬zPry zPrw ... xPrv
r xPry yRrz zPrw ... xPrv
Table 2: Information table.
The assumption that the only externality suffered arises from vPx implies
row 1 of Table 2, which can be written as row 2. Note that xPryRrzPrwRiv
implies that [xv, α] with α > 0. The externality is strong.
It is now possible to state our main result.
Theorem 7. If there is a Sen cycle, then every individual who is decisive
over some pair in the cycle suffers at least one strong negative externality,
or at least two weak negative externalities.
Proof. If there is a Sen cycle involving three alternatives then Lemma 4 shows
that the externality suffered must be strong. If the Sen cycle involves four or
more alternatives then Lemma 6 shows that the decisive individual cannot
suffer only one weak negative externality. Therefore, the individual must
suffer at least one strong negative externality, or at least two weak negative
externalities.
It is easy to verify that individual k suffers two weak negative externalities
in Example 1, and that individuals i, j, k and l suffer at least two weak
negative externalities in Example 2.
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We now state and prove the Saari-Petron theorem. Our proof is differ-
ent to theirs, and it highlights the role played by the assumption of strict
preferences.
Theorem 8. If there is a Sen cycle, then every individual who is decisive
over some pair in the cycle and holds a strict preference ordering suffers at
least one strong negative externality.
Proof. If the Sen cycle involves three alternatives then the result follows
from Lemma 4. Suppose the Sen cycle involves four or more alternatives.
If there is just one negative externality, then the result follows from Lemma
6. Consider Table 3. Without loss of generality, assume that r is decisive
over {z, w} and that r suffers negative externalities from sP t and vPx. This
gives rise to the first row of the information table. The dots in the columns
indicate that r’s ranking of that pair in the cycle is identical to the social
ranking. By way of contradiction, assume that both the {s, t} and {v, x}
externalities are weak, with s, t, v and x distinct.
{x, y} ... {s, t} ... {z, w} ... {v, x}
r xPry ... tPrs ... zPrw ... xPrv
r xPry ... tPrs ... zPrw ... vPrx
r xPry ... sPrt ... zPrw ... vPrx
Table 3: Saari-Petron theorem.
Note that if r holds a strict preference ordering and these two negative
externalities are weak, then these pairwise rankings can be reversed (one at
a time) without affecting any other pairwise ranking. In row 2, r’s {v, x}
ranking has been reversed, for example, without any other pairwise ranking
changing. However, in row 3, r’s {s, t} ranking has been reversed and this
leads to intransitive preferences for r. This is a contradiction and so the
{s, t} externality must have been strong, not weak.
If t = v then consider Table 4.
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{x, y} ... {s, t} {t, x}
r xPry ... tPrs xPrt
Table 4: When t = v.
From row 1, we can see that xPryPrs and also that xPrtPrs. Given that
the externalities are weak and that r holds a strict preference ordering, we
have xPrtPrsPryPrs. However, this leads to intransitive preferences for r
and so one of these externalities must have been strong, not weak.
When preferences are weak, the argument in Theorem 8 no longer ap-
plies. First, if r holds a weak preference ordering and negative externalities
are weak, then it does not follow that these pairwise rankings can be reversed
(one at a time) without affecting any other pairwise ranking. In Example 1
we have zPkxIkwPky and k suffers a weak negative externality from yPw.
Reversing k’s {y, w} ranking will affect her {x, y} ranking. Second, for the
argument in Table 4, the assumption of strict preferences is critical. If pref-
erences are weak, then we could have xPryIrtPrs and this would not be
intransitive.
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